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DISSENT, DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRACY: HEATHER 
GERKEN AND THE CONTINGENT IMPERATIVE OF 
MINORITY RULE 
Guy-Uriel Charles* 
It is my pleasure and honor to participate in this symposium in honor of my friend, 
Heather Gerken. Heather is one of our generation’s leading academics. Her scholarship 
consistently displays an engagement with an important problem coupled with an ingen-
ious, sometimes counterintuitive, yet always thoughtful, normative framework for think-
ing about and resolving the problem. She is an absolutely wonderful theorist of the polit-
ical process. She is also one of the hardest working and conscientious individuals in legal 
academia. 
One would be hard-pressed to find a more supremely thoughtful soul than Profes-
sor Gerken. There are many great legal minds; there are also many thoughtful souls in 
legal academia. But there are a few academics who possess great minds and great souls. I 
have always counted it as a privilege to be able to call her my friend. 
My talk today will be about one of Professor Gerken’s intellectual passions: mak-
ing democracy work for minorities. I will use minorities here in the classical sense to 
mean a group that is a numerical minority, that is socially discrete, and that has distinc-
tive political interests or preferences from the majority.
1
 Part of Professor Gerken’s work 
has been motivated by the important task of making representative democracy work for 
all of its citizens, including those that are its perennial losers. This motivation is clearly 
evident in early Gerken works, such as Second-Order Diversity,
2
 and Dissenting by De-
ciding.
3
 But it is also evident in later Gerken works such as Federalism All the Way 
Down
4
 and Uncooperative Federalism.
5
 A critical and subtle theme of each of these im-
portant pieces is that the institutional structures of democracy ought to permit the effec-
tive participation by minorities. 
My talk will explore this particular theme in Gerken’s work. In light of the aims of 
this panel, I will focus primarily on Second-Order Diversity, which explores this theme 
more explicitly. But I will also rely on Dissenting by Deciding. I will first review the 
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case as it is laid out in Second-Order Diversity. I will then offer some criticisms of 
Gerken’s claims. Finally, I will return to affirm the underlying project and offer some 
important lessons that we learn from Professor Gerken’s work. In particular, I will high-
light the fact that Professor Gerken underscores for us the importance of wielding deci-
sive power in a representative democracy. Professor Gerken is a power theorist. She re-
minds us that self-government is not a procedural exercise; it is not simply a right to 
speak; it is not simply a right to vote; it is not participation for the sake of political par-
ticipation. While the expressive and symbolic components of political participation are 
important to self-government, a core component of self-government is the exercise of 
meaningful and consequential power.
6
 Even the losers must sometimes be winners if 
self-government is to be actualized.
7
 
PART I 
Gerken is a political theorist and quite a good one. Included among the many 
themes that her work explores is the normative morality of minority rule. She is part of a 
long line of theorists interested in understanding the limitations of majority decision-
making
8
 and the concomitant benefits of minority rule.
9 
Political theorists have long un-
derstood that majoritarian decision-making is sometimes morally and normatively prob-
lematic.
10
 Though majoritarianism is an important democratic principle, it is not an unal-
loyed good.
11
 In recognition of the limits of majority rule, political theory has long 
explored substantive and procedural limits to majority rule.
12
 
                                                          
 6. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION 
OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 30 (1990) (describing the “equation” of self-determination: “If self-determination is 
‘an expression in succinct form, of the aspiration to rule one’s self and not to be ruled by others,’ then this self-
rule implies meaningful participation in the process of government.” (footnote omitted)). 
 7. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 3–6 (1994) (describing what she calls a “Madisonian Majority” in which fairness of majority rule 
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 8. See generally, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); GUINIER, supra 
note 7; AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (2008).   
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concern that majority rule may nevertheless take the form of a despotic government can be traced back at least 
as far as Aristotle. Aristotle, Politica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1127 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). 
But the modern dialogue regarding the dangers of majoritarian democracies is often traced to the Founders. 
E.g., 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 291 (1797).     
 11. See DAHL, supra note 8, at 9–10 (“For the objective test of non-tyranny is not the size of the ruling 
group; it is whether the ruling group, whatever its size, imposes severe deprivations on the ‘natural rights’ of 
[its] citizens.”); LIJPHART, supra note 8, at 112–21 (arguing that definitions of majority rule often assume “re-
straints on majorities” and in particular that “the essence of Madisonianism is the restraint of the majority’s 
power”). 
 12. The appropriate limits on majoritarian rule preoccupied the Founders. See, for example, THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (advocating for external checks and balances in the context of a president 
elected independently of Congress), and countless others concerned with the legitimacy of majoritarian rule. 
See sources cited supra note 10.   
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For the most part, political theory has understood that democracy owes something 
to political minorities.
13 
And political theory has been relatively clear that what democ-
racy owes to political minorities are procedural safeguards and a limited set of substan-
tive rights.
14
 Fundamentally, few have questioned the moral imperative of majorities to 
wield substantive power, provided of course that they do so within established con-
straints.
15 
But within those constraints majorities are entitled to rule and minorities are 
expected to lose and all of this is normatively acceptable.
16
 This is the standard account. 
From at least one perspective in democratic theory, the normative imperative of 
majority rule is unproblematic because majority coalitions are transitory.
17
 To put this in 
slightly different terms, but in the conceptual formulation of classical democratic theory, 
majoritarianism is unobjectionable so long as we take turns ruling and being ruled.
18
 An 
important assumption of classical democratic theory is that those who rule will submit to 
being ruled and those who are ruled will take turns ruling.
19
 This is one way of actuating 
self-government and justifying majority decision-making: not as power but as right.
20
 
Whether one adheres to the more modern Dahlian conception of shifting majority coali-
tions or the more classical conception that ruler and ruled are ever-changing categories 
where everyone gets a turn in each condition, the point remains that neither majoritarian 
nor minority status are expected to be permanent categories.
21
 
This critical assumption of democratic theory is thus violated where majority and 
minority status are permanent or semi-permanent categories.
22
 Where minorities in a 
democracy are perpetual losers, one cannot credibly warrant that they are self-governing 
notwithstanding procedural safeguards and a limited set of substantive rights that may be 
afforded by a fundamental law to the minority.
23
 Of course, the permanent majority is 
certainly self-governing. But it is difficult to make the same case for the permanent mi-
nority, even where the minority has a right to be heard or to dissent from the majority’s 
decision. Where there are permanent majorities and minorities, democratic theorists are 
presented with two important challenges for democracy. First, how does democracy ac-
tualize its fundamental promise — self-rule — for minorities? Second, how does one jus-
                                                          
 13. GUINIER, supra note 7, at 78 (“[I]nstitutionalizing minority rights is a necessary constraint on the pro-
cesses of majoritarian democracy.”); see THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: 
DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITS 295–99 (2008) (arguing that whether or not a majority acts oppres-
sively, persistent minorities undermine the authority of the majority if democratic authority is premised on pub-
lic equality). 
 14. See ANTHONY MCGANN, THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY: RECONCILING EQUALITY, DELIBERATION, AND 
MINORITY PROTECTION 103–09 (2006) (discussing (and challenging) the standard argument that constitutional-
ly protected rights are necessary to protect minority interests).  
 15. See Mathias Risse, Arguing for Majority Rule, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 41 (2004) (offering a brief history of 
arguments in support of majority rule).   
 16. See id. at 48. 
 17. See DAHL, supra note 8, at 34–62; ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN 
AMERICAN CITY (1961).   
 18. GUINIER, supra note 7, at 5–6 (“Taking turns attempts to build consensus while recognizing political or 
social differences, and it encourages everyone to play.”).     
 19. Id. at 6.  
 20. Id.; see Risse, supra note 15, at 48.    
 21. DAHL, supra note 8, at 34–62; GUINIER, supra note 7, at 5–6; Risse, supra note 15, at 48–49.   
 22. CHRISTIANO, supra note 13, at 226–30; see LIJPHART, supra note 8, at 122 (discussing the problem of 
legitimacy that majorities may face in societies with “deep societal divisions”).  
 23. CHRISTIANO, supra note 13, at 226–28.   
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tify majority-rule in the case of permanent majorities and permanent minorities? 
This is the challenge that Gerken takes on. She confronts the question — though 
not precisely in the terms I have laid out above — most directly in Dissenting by Decid-
ing.
24
 Dissenting by Deciding is intriguing and ambitious. It takes seriously the notion 
that minorities ought to wield decisive political power.
25
 Gerken’s solution to the prob-
lem of permanent majorities and minorities is relatively straightforward, which is to de-
sign institutional structures so that minorities can wield consequential power.
26
 Let us 
consider her argument in relative detail. 
Gerken’s opening move is the argument that perpetual minorities27 who disagree 
with a permanent majority’s decision generally “have two choices with regard to govern-
ance: act moderately or speak radically.”28 By acting moderately, Gerken means that mi-
norities can threaten to dissent from the majority’s decision in order to influence the ma-
jority’s decision. Other than actually dissenting — I will return to this point momentarily 
— for Gerken, acting moderately, that is, influencing the majority’s decision is the best 
that minorities can expect, at least when it comes to governance.
29
 She explains: 
Would-be dissenters who deploy this strategy get to take part in an act of govern-
ance, but it is governance of a moderate sort. And even if the dissenter gets an op-
portunity to wield the authority of the state, dissent takes the form of an argument, 
one designed to persuade other members of the decisionmaking body to take a 
different stance. Dissenters speak truth to power — to those with a majority of the 
votes.
30
 
Importantly, the final decision, even as influenced by the minority’s threat of dis-
sent, is not the minority’s decision, but that of the majority.31 The minority is not partici-
pating in governance, not wielding the power of the state, but making an argument to the 
decisionmaker, always the majority.
32
 
In the alternative, minorities can dissent. Or in Gerkenian terms, they can speak 
radically.
33
 When minorities dissent, they do so “with a critical rather than authoritative 
voice; they speak on behalf of themselves, not the polity.”34 In any event, whether acting 
moderately or speaking radically, minorities do not wield political power.
35
 They are al-
ways “speaking truth to power” as opposed to acting with power.36 
 
                                                          
 24. Gerken, supra note 3, at 1746–47. 
 25. Id. at 1747. 
 26. Id. at 1748. 
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 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 1747. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. I shall return to question this construction. Why is the decision, which is made with the minority’s 
input and influence, imputed only to the majority and not to the minority as well? This is an odd conception of 
state power. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
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In order to act with power, or in Gerken’s terms, in order to act radically, minori-
ties need to dissent by deciding.
37
 “Dissenting by deciding,” Gerken instructs, “occurs 
when would-be dissenters — individuals who hold a minority view within the polity as a 
whole — enjoy a local majority on a decisionmaking body and can thus dictate the out-
come.”38 Dissenting by deciding is the process by which minorities use and create local-
ized institutions that enable minorities to become majorities and thus wield consequential 
political power.
39
 
Dissenting by deciding’s (“DBD”) antagonist is what Gerken calls conventional 
dissent.
40
 Gerken argues that DBD is different from conventional dissent in three ways: 
(1) dissenting by deciding is embodied in a decision, not an argument; (2) it gives 
electoral minorities a chance to speak truth with power, fusing an act of contesta-
tion with an act of affiliation; and (3) dissenters who decide are able to act with 
the authority of the state collectively rather than in relative isolation.
41
 
I will refer to these distinctions respectively as the act/speech distinction; the con-
sequential/expressive distinction; and the private/state distinction. Gerken argues that 
when minorities engage in conventional dissent they are always engaged in making ar-
guments.
42
 Recall her point that even when minorities threaten to dissent from the major-
ity’s decision unless the majority modifies its decision in their favor — a move that she 
terms acting moderately — dissenters are not really acting but making arguments.43 
Thus “one key difference between conventional dissent and dissenting by deciding is that 
the latter takes the form of a decision, not an argument.”44 This is the act/speech distinc-
tion and it refers to Gerken’s argument that DBD is action but conventional dissent is 
speech.
45
 
Gerken further argues that DBD is different from conventional dissent because it 
gives minorities a chance to speak truth with power.
46
 She explains that DBD “allows 
dissenters to challenge the majority’s views at the same moment they act on behalf of the 
state.”47 DBD, Gerken explains, “offers electoral minorities not only the dignity to par-
ticipate, but the dignity to decide.”48 This is the consequential/expressive distinction. 
The essence of this argument is that minorities are able to wield consequential political 
power in a world in which we adjust institutions to reflect the values of DBD.
49
 In a 
world outside of the principles of DBD, participation by minorities is simply expres-
sive.
50
 Participation is inconsequential because minorities are not sufficiently numerous 
                                                          
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1748.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1759–61 (comparing conventional dissent with dissenting by deciding). 
 41. Id. at 1754. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1746–47. 
 44. Id. at 1754. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1756. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 1776. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1776–77. 
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to have a sufficient impact on the outcome. Thus, the value of participation by minorities 
is simply expressive.
51
 
Finally, DBD differs from conventional dissent because it enables minorities to 
wield the power of the state.
52
 Gerken argues, “collective action for dissenters is neces-
sarily private action.”53 Because the operating assumption of conventional dissent is 
proportional representation, conventional dissent simply confirms the marginal status of 
permanent minorities.
54
 Minorities are either losers in governance institutions or they are 
private actors protesting the decision of state actors.
55
 In any event, they do not wield the 
power of the state.
56
 
PART II 
There is much to admire in Dissenting by Deciding, not least of which is the arti-
cle’s ambition, sophistication, and audacity. I will get to these strengths in the next part. 
But first I want to raise three questions about the case for decisional dissent as laid out in 
the article. Some of these questions Gerken addresses in the article, though not quite to 
my satisfaction, and some are not addressed at all. 
My first question is whether one can still remain a dissenter while exercising polit-
ical power as the state. When a subnational element of the state exercises consequential 
political power in a federated system (e.g., a town or city), I do not understand how one 
can meaningfully characterize that exercise of power as dissent. It seems to me that one 
loses the conceptual power of dissent when dissent is conceived in such terms. Dissent-
ers do not wield state power; once they do, they are dissenters no longer, they are the 
state. This is precisely the problem that opposition parties and movements face when 
they gain state power. They can no longer behave as dissenters. They no longer have the 
leeway and the legitimacy that comes with being dissenters; they now have the burden of 
the state. Moreover, as supporters of those formerly dissident movements have recog-
nized, the powers of state are transformative and cannot be underestimated. Former dis-
sidents’ allies who now wield state power are no longer dissidents; they now speak with 
the authority and threat of the state. 
Gerken recognizes this problem and addresses it squarely;
57
 though not convinc-
ingly, in my view. To the objection that dissenters wielding state power is a category er-
ror per diffinitionem, she concludes, without argument, “[s]uch a claim takes an unduly 
narrow view of power in . . . disaggregated institutions.”58 Because of their minority sta-
tus, even where minorities constitute a majority in a disaggregated institution, “the fact 
that electoral minorities wield control over some decisions within a disaggregated struc-
                                                          
 51. Id. at 1777. 
 52. Id. at 1778. 
 53. Id. at 1758. 
 54. Id. at 1750. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1755 (“The concern . . . is that the notion of dissenters wielding state power is a contradiction in 
terms.”). 
 58. Id. 
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ture does not alter their status as dissenters.”59 Wielding power in one domain, say for 
example constituting a decisive majority on a school board, does not change the fact that 
the minority remains a minority in all of the other domains.
60
 
Fair enough, perhaps. But this response does not meet the central objection, which 
is that when the minority exercises the power of the state, it is the state.
61
 The minority 
may be dissenters in other domains, where they do not wield state power. But they are 
not dissenters in the domain or domains in which they do wield state power. We cannot 
use their status in domains in which they do not wield power to judge and characterize 
their status in the domains in which they do wield state power. This is why we cannot 
meaningfully characterize the decision of minorities when they wield state power as acts 
of dissent. These decisions are clearly acts of state. Thus, the notion of dissenters wield-
ing state power is a “contradiction in terms.” 
Moreover, lumping together minorities exercising state power and those that are 
effectively powerless seems to rely upon an essentialist assumption, which is that what 
links these minorities together is their minority status and not, for example, their power 
status. This essentialism is problematic when it masks significant differences between 
and among minorities. To lump together minorities exercising state power and those that 
do not is to ignore a significant difference. 
This leads to my second question, which is whether the idea of dissenting by de-
ciding is itself a contradiction in terms. Gerken anticipates one version of this question 
and addresses it in the article.
62
 She notes that some might argue that dissenting by de-
ciding is a contradiction in terms because they might be of the view that “one cannot 
simultaneously oppose the state and act on its behalf.”63 I think this characterization 
slightly misses the point. The idea that one can simultaneously oppose the state and act 
on its behalf should not be controversial. The clearest example is the case of the public 
defender. Here is an individual who is appointed by the state, works for the state, acts on 
its behalf, and also simultaneously acts in opposition to the state. The objection is not to 
the idea that an entity might both represent the state and be in opposition to it. The objec-
tion is, I think, slightly subtler than that. It is to the idea that a decision of the state is it-
self oppositional. How can a decision of the state be simultaneously a decision opposi-
tional to the state? This is the critical objection. 
Professor Gerken seems to respond to this point in the article with what I think 
could be a powerful rejoinder. She points to the practice of jury nullification as an exam-
ple of an oppositional decision.
64
 The jury nullification example is arresting. But if it is 
right, it also raises more significant rule of law concerns about dissenting by deciding. 
Jury nullification is controversial and oppositional because the jury is defying established 
legal rules that would otherwise dictate the outcome of the case. The decision of the jury 
is not in and of itself oppositional. The practice of jury nullification is oppositional, but 
only because it is contrary to law. If we were to legalize the practice of jury nullification, 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 1755–56. 
 60. Id. at 1756. 
 61. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).  
 62. Gerken, supra note 3, at 1756. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 1758. 
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it would no longer be oppositional. It is only oppositional to the extent that it is in oppo-
sition to clearly established law. While I understand the idea of dissenting by deciding to 
favor decisional heterogeneity, a point to which I will return, I do not understand it to 
advocate law-breaking in support of decisional heterogeneity. That is, I do not under-
stand dissenting by deciding to advocate in favor of illegal departures from the norm. 
Thus, the jury nullification example cannot be right. 
My last question is whether the three distinctions — the act/speech distinction, the 
consequential/expressive distinction, and the private/state distinction — that DBD relies 
upon to distinguish DBD from conventional dissent are sufficiently compelling. The 
fundamental point underlying each of the three distinctions is the argument that when 
minorities engage in conventional dissent they are always engaged in expressive speech 
as private individuals.
65
 They are making arguments.
66
 By contrast, when they are en-
gaged in decisional dissenters, they act and they do so consequentially because they are 
wielding the power of the state.
67
 
My main worry here is that the distinction between conventional dissent and DBD 
is overblown. The criticism of conventional dissent assumes that conventional dissenters 
do not wield power and they do not act with the power of the state. I am not sure that 
criticism is accurate. We have many examples of conventional dissenters or minorities 
wielding significant power and sometimes acting with the power and authority of the 
state. Consider the case of a minority party in a multiparty system. In proportional sys-
tems, small minority parties wield considerable power and they act decisively with the 
authority of the state.
68
 This is the case of the Shas Party in Israel.
69
 It has wielded con-
siderable power disproportionate to its size because its assent has often been necessary to 
enable one of the main parties to form a coalition government.
70
 As part of a coalition 
government, Shas is the state and part of the governing coalition in every sense in which 
that term is meaningful.
71
 One can make the same point about a swing Justices on the 
U.S. Supreme Court.
72
 Justice Kennedy is often the example here.
73
 The point is that 
minority status need not mean marginalization. Sometimes minorities are able to wield 
decisive state power. 
 
                                                          
 65. Id. at 1758–59. 
 66. Id. at 1760. 
 67. Id. at 1762–63. 
 68. Douglas Amy, Frederick McBride & Robert Richie, New Means for Political Empowerment: Propor-
tional Voting, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL (Nov.-Dec. 2000), available at 
http://www.prrac.org/full_text.php?text_id=138&item_id=1789&newsletter_id=53&header=Community+Orga
nizing&kc=1 (advocating for proportional representation as a way to empower political minorities and offering 
examples of successful proportional voting in practice in Texas). 
 69. See Yael Yishai, Israel’s Shas: Party Prosperity and Dubious Democracy, in WHEN PARTIES PROSPER: 
THE USES OF ELECTORAL SUCCESS 231, 237–46 (Kay Lawson & Peter H. Merkl eds., 2007) (describing the 
Shas party as wielding significant power not by becoming a majority party itself but by becoming one of the 
parties in almost every coalition that the Israelis put together). 
 70. Id. at 238. 
 71. See id. at 238–44. 
 72. See Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Su-
preme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1276–77 (2005). 
 73. The Statistics, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 367 (2011) (showing Justice Kennedy agreeing with the disposi-
tion of the case 91.2% of the time, more than any other Justice). 
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Moreover, it is worth pointing out that dissenting need not always be symbolic or 
expressive. Dissenting is an act;
74
 the threat of dissent where credible can and sometimes 
does lead to a modification of a majority’s position.75 Majorities sometimes prize con-
sensus or fear dissensus.
76
 Where this is the case, minorities can use — and have — a 
majority’s fear of dissensus to force the majority to modify its position.77 Can we call the 
modification of the majority’s preferred outcome, the majority’s outcome, without in-
cluding the minority’s significant and critical influence? I do not think so. The resulting 
decision, which reflects the input of both the majority and the minority, ought to be at-
tributable to both the majority and the minority. This is why the sharp distinctions that 
DBD draws between acting and speaking, symbolism and consequentialism, and private 
and state are not sufficiently compelling. Minorities as dissenters do often act consequen-
tially and with the power of the state. 
PART III 
Now, one could argue that these criticisms are beside the point. It is not clear to me 
that the main lessons of DBD hang on the distinctions between dissent and decisional 
dissent. Recall here that the true question at hand is what democracy owes minorities. 
Put differently, what are the commitments that a society committed to self-rule owes po-
tentially permanent political losers? Is it normatively acceptable for democracy to say to 
political minorities, self-rule for me but not for thee? 
Gerken’s answer is clear and unequivocal. The promise of self-rule must be kept 
for minorities as it is for majorities.
78
 Moreover, it is not sufficient to provide procedural 
rights of participation, such as the right to speak or vote.
79
 It is also not enough to protect 
a limited set of substantive rights.
80
 Minorities are entitled to wield consequential politi-
cal power. There is a morality to self-rule. It may be a contingent moral imperative; I 
would argue that it is certainly a contingent moral imperative. But it is a moral impera-
tive nonetheless. 
There are important implications here that Gerken points us toward. First, constitu-
tional law scholars and scholars of law and politics have too long neglected the im-
portance of political power and political power matters.
81
 Constitutional law is rightly 
focused on structures and rights. But constitutional law scholars as well as scholars of 
law and politics ought to confront power and political outcomes directly and not as simp-
ly as a function of rights and structure. 
                                                          
 74. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986). 
 75. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 76–77 (1998) (discussing how Justic-
es will use their dissents and concurrences as “bargaining tools”). 
 76. See LIJPHART, supra note 8, at 111 (“Especially with regard to the most important decisions and to is-
sues that cause deep splits in societies, democracies almost uniformly deviate from majoritarian decision-
making rules, to adopt mechanisms more likely to rally a broad consensus.”).   
 77. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of 
Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1896 (2001) (discussing “memoranda indicating that Justices at least 
sometimes are willing to vote in ways inconsistent with their first-choice policy preferences”). 
 78. Gerken, supra note 3, at 1750. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 1750–51. 
 81. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS, WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN AND HOW 1 (1950) (“The study of politics 
is the study of influence and the influential.”). 
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Second, decisional heterogeneity is a contingent normative good. Assume a world 
in which there are multiple minorities with distinctive preferences, we ought to prefer 
decisional heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity.
82
 This is the fundamental logic of 
federalism.
83
 
Third, it follows from the second point that whenever we can design institutions to 
make possible decisional heterogeneity, we ought to do so. To be sure, those institutions 
ought to be consistent with other democratic commitments. So, again, this is a contingent 
point. But decisional heterogeneity ought to be an important aim of institutional design, 
which is why there is normative value to disaggregated units. 
Fourth, it also follows that we ought to be careful about nationalizing and constitu-
tionalizing fundamental commitments. If we take decisional heterogeneity very serious-
ly, we should nationalize commitments only when we are sure that they are fundamental 
and there are few, if any, benefits from decisional heterogeneity. There are important 
reasons for nationalization but it is worth fighting about what ought to be nationalized 
and what ought to be left to local preferences. 
Fifth, there is a particular lesson for race and law scholars. Scholars of race and 
law ought to care more about federalism and federalism scholars ought to care more 
about race. Federalism scholars are generally at best racial agnostics and race scholars 
are generally nationalists. Of course there are important historical reasons for race schol-
ars to be leery of federalism arguments. There are, however, also good reasons for race 
scholars to begin a reconsideration of the relationship between federalism and race. To 
the extent that race scholars care about minority rights, they ought to care a lot more 
about federalism than they currently do. By the same token, it is high time for federalism 
scholars to confront and conquer federalism’s racist history. Race is the big African ele-
phant in the room that federalism scholarship and doctrine have essentially tried to ig-
nore. To the extent that federalism is about providing opportunities for minorities to 
rule,
84
 it is strange that federalism scholarship and doctrine do not care significantly 
more about the political power of America’s quintessential minorities, racial groups. A 
reconsideration and incorporation of race into federalism doctrine and scholarship is nec-
essary to rehabilitate if not cleanse federalism. 
I am confident that these Gerkenean insights will guide our field for many decades 
to come. 
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 84. This is certainly not all that federalism is about, but self-rule is certainly an important and critical com-
ponent. 
